Looking Forward: The Need for Alternatives to Helium-3 in IAEA Safeguards

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Looking Forward: The Need for Alternatives to Helium-3 in IAEA Safeguards

[NPWG] Research - IAEA Team
Helium-3 detectors are presently the standard for neutron detection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because of their desirable neutron detection characteristics. Helium-3 based systems provide high neutron detection efficiency, excellent gamma ray discrimination, and a non- toxic stable base material. They are used extensively in IAEA monitoring and verification activities, including but not limited to nuclear fuel monitoring, detection of undisclosed materials, and verification of declared special nuclear material [1]. Though the IAEA acquires the majority of its Helium-3 from the US, the US national Helium-3 stockpile has been decreasing since the cold war [2]. The IAEA’s heavy reliance on Helium-3, the ever-increasing demand on safeguards verification resources, and the current Helium-3 shortage has created an unstable situation for the IAEA.The ability for the IAEA to effectively monitor nonproliferation obligations under a limitedbudget is critical to the international nonproliferation regime, including the verification of existing and future nuclear arms control agreements, and ensuring the safe growth of nuclear power. Although the IAEA has historically relied solely on the United States for Helium-3, the current deficit requires the IAEA to use alternative sources and evaluate potential alternative detection systems to replace Helium-3-based detectors [3]. This work explores the historical and technical reasons for the shortage; the role of Helium-3 in the IAEA; and recommendations for future safeguards detector implementation. Although there is currently a shortage of Helium-3, the IAEA has yet to feel major repercussions of this shortage. However, as there are 320 proposed nuclear power plants around the world [5] and the IAEA has seen near-zero growth budgets, the strain on IAEA’s safeguards resources will continue to increase. Therefore, we recommend that the IAEA seek to diversify its radiation detection arsenal. Furthermore, it is in the IAEA’s best interest to increase transparency on technical issues to encourage scientists from around the world to develop novel detectors suited of the IAEA’s needs. Through diversifying its detection mechanisms and reducing its reliance on Helium-3, the IAEA can better ensure its ability to serve as an accurate, stable, and long-term tool for verification.

(1) Zendel and M. Moeslinger, “IAEA Safeguards Equipment”, Presented at the USSP-IAEA Workshop on Advanced Sensors for Safeguards, Santa Fe, USA, 23 – 27 April 2007.
(2)  Persons, T. M. & Aloise, G. (2011). Report GAO-11-753. US Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, USA.
(3)  House Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Caught by Surprise: Causes and 
Consequences of the Helium-3 Supply Crisis, hearing held April 22, 2010.
(4)  Pickrell, Mark M, et al. “The IAEA Workshop on Requirements and Potential Technologies for Replacement of Helium-3 in IAEA 
Safeguards Applications.” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management., Volume 41, Issue 2. Winter 2013.
(5)  Plans for New Nuclear Reactors Worldwide. (March 2013). World Nuclear Association. Retrieved April 25, 2014, from http://www.world- nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-Generation/Plans-For-New-Reactors-Worldwide/

Focus Areas:

  • Nuclear Engineering
  • Radiation Detection and Instrumentation
  • Nuclear Security Policy

Team members:

  • Team lead: Alexandra (Sasha) Asghari, Graduate Student in Nuclear Engineering
  • Naomi Egel, Recent graduate in International Area Studies: Peace and Conflict Studies
  • Luis Morales, Undergraduate in Nuclear Engineering and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
  • Shreyas Srinivasan, Undergraduate in Nuclear Engineering and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
  • Adriana Ureche, Undergradate in Nuclear Engineering
  • Apratim Vidyarthi, Undergraduate in Nuclear Engineering and Applied Math
  • David Weisz, Graduate Student in Nuclear Engineering